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TAXATION OF DAMAGES AFTER SCHLEIER - WHERE
ARE WE AND WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
By Douglas A. Kahn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1919, statutory tax law has excluded from gross income
damages received on account of a personal injury or sickness.' The
exclusion currently is set forth in § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986.2 The construction of that statutory exclusion, both by
* The author wishes to express appreciation to his colleague, Kyle Logue, for the many
helpful comments and criticisms that he provided on a draft of this article.
1. The first statutory provision was adopted in 1919 as part of the Revenue Act of 1918.
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919).
2. The current version of I.R.C. § 104(a) reads in relevant part:
SEC. 104. COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in
excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 ... for any prior taxable year, gross
income does not include-...
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sick-
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the courts and by the Commissioner, has undergone a number of
changes and flip-flops over its 76-year history. A few years ago, the
Supreme Court addressed this issue when it decided United States v.
Burke. The Supreme Court rested its decision in Burke on its con-
struction of a long-standing regulation.4 The construction adopted by
the Court, however, proved to be inadequate for several reasons. It
created distinctions that were difficult to draw and that did not comport
with the purposes of the statute. Moreover, it gave the taxpayer too
much room for manipulation. While some of the fault can be attributed
to the regulation itself and the Commissioner's application of the regu-
lation, the Supreme Court's decision in Burke (as it was read by many
lower courts and by the Commissioner) only made matters worse.
Less than three years after Burke was decided, the Supreme Court
again dealt with the meaning and application of § 104(a)(2) in its 1995
decision in Commissioner v. Schleier' The problems created by the
Court's decision in Burke made subsequent litigation (or legislative
action) inevitable. While the Schleier decision arrived at a second-best
solution, it is an improvement over Burke and over the state of the law
on this issue that existed shortly before Burke. Schleier removes most,
albeit not all, of the potential for manipulation that previously existed
and provides a considerable degree of certainty in what had been a cha-
otic comer of the tax law. In addition, Schleier's construction of the
statute comports more closely with the policies that underlie
§ 104(a)(2) than did prior judicial constructions. In any event, Schleier
has significantly altered the construction of § 104(a)(2), and the subse-
quent tax treatment of damages will be controlled by that decision,
even perhaps certain aspects of damages for which taxation is' deter-
mined by the 1996 Amendment of § 104.
This article will examine the reasoning of the Schleier decision
and speculate as to how taxation of pre-1996 damages will likely apply
in light of Schleier. First, the article will set forth a very brief history
of the judicial and administrative constructions of the statutory exclu-
sion, and explore tax policy justifications for providing an exclusion
from gross income for certain damages. These latter two items (set
ness; . . .
Paragraph (2) shall not apply to punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical
injury or physical sickness.
3. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
5. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
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forth in Parts II and III of this article) are areas that have been exten-
sively addressed previously by several commentators, including the
author of this article.' The reason for exploring tax policy issues is to
permit the reader to judge the merits of the Schleier decision in light of
the underlying policies for having an exclusion. The reader who is
familiar with the historical and tax policy material, or simply isn't
interested in it, might wish to skip over Parts II and III of this article.
Part IV of this article discusses the Supreme Court's Burke deci-
sion and explains its inadequacy. A discussion of the Schleier decision
and its significance begins at Part V of this article.
II. HISTORY
Before the enactment of the antecedent to § 104(a)(2), Treasury
initially took the position that damages received for a personal injury
were includible in gross income. In an early regulation, Treasury
analogized such damages to the proceeds of accident insurance which
Treasury assumed to be taxable.7 However, in 1918, the Attorney Gen-
eral promulgated an opinion concluding that accident insurance pro-
ceeds are not taxable because they constitute a kind of conversion of
human capital caused by the injury.' As a consequence of the Attorney
General's opinion, Treasury promptly revoked the regulation that desig-
nated personal injury damages as taxable. Instead, Treasury held that
''an amount received by an individual as result of a suit or compromise
for personal injuries sustained by him through accident" is not included
in gross income.9 Then, in 1919, when Congress adopted the predeces-
sor of Code § 104(a)(2) as part of the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress
included a provision that excluded from income: "[a]mounts received,
through accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation
6. E.g., Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To
Tax or Not To Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327 (1995); Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax
and Non-Tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 701 (1977); Margaret Henning, Recent
Developments in the Tax Treatment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAX
LAW. 783 (1992); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 143 (1992).
7. Treas. Reg. § 33, art. 4 (1918) stated: an "[a]mount received as the result of a suit or
compromise for personal injury, being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is to be ac-
counted for as income."
8. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). The Attorney General's opinion apparently was
made as a consequence of the definition of "income" that was adopted in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.
Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918) as "the gain derived from capital, from labor or from both com-
bined." (citing Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1915)).
9. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
1995]
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acts, as compensation for injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any
damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such in-
juries or sickness."1
The subsequent history of the Service's construction of the statuto-
ry provision reflects vacillations and sometimes total reversal of posi-
tions. Similarly, the decisions of the courts have gone in every direc-
tion.11
One lower court decision worth noting in particular is the Tax
Court's decision in Threlkeld v. Commissioner.2 In Threlkeld, the Tax
Court stated that § 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income compensatory
damages "received on account of any invasion of the rights that an
individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the
law."' 3 According to the Tax Court, the crucial test is whether the
injury that an individual suffered is a "personal injury." In Threlkeld,
the Tax Court further stated, "[t]o determine whether the injury com-
plained of is personal, we must look to the origin and character of the
claim [citations omitted] and not to the consequences that result from
the injury."' 4 After Threlkeld was decided, and until the Supreme
Court entered the fray, it was generally believed that, with the possible
exception of punitive damages, the nature of damages received by a
taxpayer had little or no bearing on the question of whether the damag-
es were excludible from gross income.
The Supreme Court's 1992 decision in United States v. Burke5
brought the nature of damages back into the picture to some extent by
making the test of excludibility turn on the range of damages that are
available for a claim. The 1995 decision of the Supreme Court in
10. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919). The
Ways and Means Committee Report on this provision stated:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or
health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal
injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are
required to be included in gross income. The proposed bill provides that such amounts
shall not be included in gross income.
H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 86, 92.
11. For a summary of the paths taken by the Service and by the courts, see Kahn, supra note
6, at 330-39.
12. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) (reviewed by the court), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
Threlkeld involved a recovery for injury to the taxpayer's professional reputation that was caused
by a malicious prosecution. Id.
13. Id. at 1308.
14. Id. at 1299.
15. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
QLR [Vol. 15:305308
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Schleier16 makes the identification of the type of injury for which each
specific recovery item is obtained a crucial factor in determining
whether the receipt of that item is excluded from gross income."7
III. TAX POLICY
There have been a number of different rationales suggested for the
exclusion from income of personal injury damages. In a prior article of
the author, the several possible policy justifications for the exclusion
were examined and critiqued. 8 This Part III consists of a brief explo-
ration of those policy considerations that the author deems to be the
most significant. For a more thorough treatment of tax policy consider-
ations, see the author's article in the Florida Tax Review. 9
A. Return of Human Capital
While there is uncertainty as to precisely what considerations led
Congress to adopt the antecedent to § 104(a)(2), the background history
of that provision does indicate that Congress focused on the "return of
human capital" theory that is described below. The human capital justi-
fication has been criticized as inadequate to support the exclusion.
Even if that criticism is correct," and even if the original rationale for
the adoption of the statutory exclusion could be determined with cer-
tainty, it is not necessary to accept the "return of human capital" theory
as the justification for the retention of the statutory exclusion. A statute
may be adopted for one reason that is later abandoned; and, yet, the
statute may be retained because it is justified by quite different reasons
than the one that originally spawned it.
There are a number of good reasons why the human capital theory
standing alone does not justify § 104(a)(2). Firstly, for gain measure-
ment purposes, it makes no difference whether the amount of damages
received differs from the value of the rights that the taxpayer lost. Gain
is measured by the difference between the amount realized and the
basis that a taxpayer has in the asset for which payment is received.2
While it may be difficult or even impossible to determine the market
16. Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
17. See discussion infra parts IV and V.
18. Kahn, supra note 6, at 340-60.
19. Id.
20. As noted later in this Part III, the author agrees that the return of human capital theory
alone is not sufficient to justify the exclusion.
21. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
1995]
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value of a personal right that was destroyed, it is irrelevant for gain
measurement purposes what value an asset that was sold or destroyed
had. For example, if X owned a rare vase in which she had a basis of
only $1,000, and if the vase was destroyed by the negligence of Y, the
gain that X would recognize on receiving compensation from Y would
be measured by X's $1,000 basis without regard to the actual value of
the vase. Let us assume that the vase had a value of $500,000 before it
was destroyed. Let us assume further that Y paid X only $28,000 as
compensation for the injury. X accepted that small amount because it
was the most that she believed that she could obtain from Y given the
latter's financial resources. X did not subsequently purchase any re-
placement property. Even though the compensation that X received is
substantially less than the value of the destroyed item, X recognizes a
gain of $27,000 (the difference between the amount she received and
her basis in the vase). 2 If damages for the loss of personal rights are
to be treated differently, the reason does not lie exclusively in the
impossibility of measuring the value of those rights.
Secondly, it should not matter that it is not feasible to determine
the basis (if any) that a taxpayer has in the body parts or personal
rights that were damaged. A taxpayer has the burden of establishing the
amount of basis that he has in an asset;23 and, if none can be estab-
lished, the basis is treated as zero. But, since a person does not antici-
pate having the parts of his body (or personal rights) converted into
cash, people do not keep records as to capital expenditures they may
have had in connection therewith, and it may be deemed appropriate to
accord them relief by excluding all or part of their gain." One diffi-
culty with that approach is that it is highly unlikely that a person has
any basis in his body parts or in his personal rights.' It is impossible
to determine what portion of expenditures that might conceivably be
attributed to body parts (such as the purchase of food and clothing and
medical care) should be so allocated. Moreover, to the extent that an
allocation of such expenditures to body parts would be feasible, the
allocated part would be in the nature of maintenance and repairs. Such
expenditures cannot be capitalized and added to basis. Maintenance and
22. If X had reinvested all or part of the proceeds in replacement property, all or part of her
gain would have been deferred under I.R.C. § 1033 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 779 (1944).
24. See, Dodge, supra note 6, at 152.
25. See, Dodge, supra note 6, at 152.
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repairs can be deducted currently when incurred in connection with a
business or profit venture.26 Such expenditures are not capital expendi-
tures and so are not included in an asset's basis regardless of whether
they were deductible when incurred.27 It therefore is highly unlikely
that anyone has a meaningful basis in any of his body parts, and it
would be overly generous to exclude from income damages received
for such an injury solely because of the understandable failure of per-
sons to keep records of their investment in their bodies.
Thirdly, some courts and commentators28 have suggested that the
fact that § 104(a)(2) excludes from taxation damages received in substi-
tution of lost income undercuts the possibility that the "recovery of
human capital" theory is the justification for § 104(a)(2). This is a
different point than the one that the author makes below in asserting
that if the "recovery of human capital theory" were valid and were
applied consistently throughout the tax law, the gain from the sale of a
personal right would not be taxed.29
The justification for the 1983 amendment of § 104(a)(2), which
permits damages for a personal injury to be received in periodic install-
ments without causing the recipient to recognize income because of the
interest element in the deferred receipts, is problematic. If an interest
element were to be segregated and taxed, it would be necessary to
calculate the amount of the periodic payments that constitute interest.
To do so, one would need to settle on a rate of interest and on the
frequency with which interest will be compounded. The most likely
reason for Congress's precluding the imputation of interest on periodic
payments of damages is to relieve victims of the administrative burden
of making those calculations." The 1983 amendment was not adopted
to further the goals that are otherwise served by the other parts of
§ 104(a). Rather than that provision's raising doubts as to whether
there is a discernable purpose underlying § 104(a)(2), the weakness of
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958).
27. I.T. 4094, 1952-2 C.B. 134.
28. See, e.g., Yorio, supra note 6, at 712.
29. See infra Subpart III D 2. The author does not share the view that the statutory exclusion
from taxation of damages received for lost income is inconsistent with the "recovery of human
capital" justification. The statutory treatment of damages for lost income rests on a separate and
independent rationale; it is neither supported by nor inconsistent with the recovery of human cap-
ital theory. A principal reason for excluding compensation for lost income is discussed in Subpart
III D 2 of this article.
30. See Brabson v. United States 73 F.3d 1040 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996).
19951
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the independent justification for the 1983 amendment merely raises the
question of whether the adoption of that amendment was wise.
Finally, and most significantly, the "return of human capital"
rationale simply does not jibe with the tax law's treatment of the vol-
untary disposition of human capital. The exclusion from gross income
of § 104(a)(2) applies only to damages (or to a settlement obtained on
account of a claim for such damages) received on account of a personal
injury or sickness. It has no application to the voluntary sale of a part
of an individual's body or of a personal right. Currently, federal law
prohibits the sale of human organs." But, if such sales were not pro-
hibited, and if a person were to sell one of his organs32 (for example,
he might sell one of his kidneys to a person needing a transplant), the
entire amount received by the seller would be taxable to him. It would
not matter that the compensation he received merely replaced a part of
his human capital or that he might have had an unascertainable amount
of basis in that organ.
The prohibition against the sale of a human organ does not apply
to the sale of blood. It is well established that if an individual sells his
blood, the amount realized on the sale constitutes ordinary income to
the seller.33
It is clear then that not all payments that substitute a monetary
payment for a personal right or human capital are excluded from in-
come. So, neither the fact of such a substitution nor the unascertainable
basis of such items is sufficient by itself to justify an exclusion from
income. Of course, the "return of human capital" consideration might
be combined with other factors to justify the exclusion provided by
§ 104(a)(2). That possibility is examined in Subparts C and D.
31. The National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274(e).
32. Also, a person might go ahead and sell an organ in violation of the federal law. The
amount received for the organ would be taxable to him. The taxation of that amount does not
depend upon there being some public policy against excluding amounts received in violation of
the law. No such policy rationale is needed.
33. In Green v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229, 1233-35 (1980), the Tax Court held that pay-
ments received for the sale of blood are included in gross income. The taxpayer in Green did not
dispute that such receipts are taxable. The issue that she raised concerned the question of the
deductibility of certain expenses she incurred with regard to the sale of her blood. Nevertheless,
the Tax Court passed on the issue of taxability. Id. at 1223. In Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d
1538, 1540 (11 th Cir. 1986), the court denied the taxpayer a charitable deduction for the donation
of his blood because, if the taxpayer had sold his blood, he would have recognized ordinary in-
come equal to the amount he received from the sale. No charitable deduction is allowed for the
amount of a contribution that would have constituted ordinary income if the item had instead been
sold by the donor for its fair market value. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) (1994).
QLR
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B. Involuntary Conversion
Another suggested rationale rests on the fact that the taxpayer did
not voluntarily choose to dispose of the personal right or body part in
question, and so it seems rapacious to tax him on the damages he re-
ceived as compensation for such a personal loss. When tangible proper-
ty is destroyed, the damages received in exchange therefor will cause
the realization of income to the extent that the amount received exceeds
the taxpayer's basis in the destroyed item. But, the involuntariness of
the conversion of the item into cash does arouse sympathy because of
the forced recognition of previously unrealized gain that had accrued to
the item in question. Accordingly, the tax law provides relief for the
taxpayer who is in that predicament.34 If, within a specified period of
time, the taxpayer invests all or part of the amount realized on the
conversion to acquire an item or items of property that are similar or
related in service or use to the destroyed property, all or part of the
gain that the taxpayer realized on the conversion will not be taxed at
that time.35 Instead, the taxpayer's investment in the destroyed item
will be rolled over and become part of the basis that the taxpayer ac-
quires in the replacement property.36 In effect, all or part of the
taxpayer's realized gain is deferred until the taxpayer disposes of the
replacement property (or until the taxpayer is allowed depreciation
deductions for that property if it is a depreciable asset).37
The question then is whether the involuntariness of the conversion
of a taxpayer's personal rights or body parts is a sufficient justification
for excluding from income the damages he received. In most such
cases, the taxpayer has no means of reinvesting the proceeds in some-
thing similar or related in service or use to the destroyed item. If some
type of replacement can be located, its cost typically will be substan-
tially less than the amount of damages suffered by the taxpayer, and so
the application of a § 1033 deferral concept would be of little value.
For example, a taxpayer who lost an arm may be able to replace it with
an artificial limb, but the cost of that limb likely will be far less than
the amount of damages that the taxpayer will receive for his injury.
Much of what the taxpayer lost cannot be replaced.
Since a deferral of gain is not readily available, should the taxpay-
er be taxed on the entire amount of the gain at the time of receipt or
34. I.R.C. § 1033 (1994).
35. I.R.C. § 1033(a) (1994).
36. I.R.C. § 1033(b) (1994).
37. 1.R.C. § 1033(a) (1994).
19951
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should some relief be provided? For example, the taxation of a pay-
ment that is received in a lump sum in one year may cause a bunching
of income that will subject the taxpayer to a large tax because of the
operation of the graduated rate system that the tax law employs. At the
least, one might expect some relief from the bunching effect-perhaps
some form of income-averaging.
Instead, the tax law permanently excludes all such damages from
income. 8 It does not merely defer the income, nor does it provide
relief from the bunching effect. It seems that involuntariness alone is
not a sufficient justification for this extraordinary exclusionary treat-
ment since the involuntary conversion of tangible property is not
treated so gently.
C. Combination of Considerations
Given the sympathy that a personal injury engenders, perhaps the
combination of the fact that a personal right or body part was destroyed
(the "return of human capital" theory) and the involuntariness of the
conversion is sufficient to warrant the exclusion. That is, even though
neither factor alone is sufficient, the cumulative effect of the combina-
tion of those two factors may be sufficient. The whole may well be
greater than the sum of its parts.
D. The Author's Explanation
The author believes that there are two additional factors that color
the combination of the "return of human capital" theory and the invol-
untariness of the conversion of a body part. The addition of that color-
ation makes a compelling case for the exclusion of such damages, at
least when given for a physical injury.
1. Noncommercial zone
The tax law is aimed at commercial transactions. Of course, the
gain recognized from the sale of an item that is held for personal use,
such as a residence or an item of jewelry, will be taxed; but, in such
cases, the taxpayer has chosen to place the item into the commercial
market by putting it up for sale. Moreover, those types of property are
commonly bought and sold in the market place and are properly re-
garded as commercial items. In contrast, noncommercial personal at-
38. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
QLR
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tributes are not traded in the market place and so lie outside of the
zone of properties and activities at which the tax laws are aimed.
For example, if two persons agree to exchange their services, each
will typically have to include in income an amount equal to the value
of the services he received from the other. However, when a hus-
band and wife agree to exchange their services by splitting the house-
hold chores between them, neither recognizes any income.' Similarly,
if several persons, who live in Manhattan and each of whom owns a
small piece of land in Long Island on which vegetables are grown,
were to agree to take turns traveling to Long Island and watering the
gardens owned by all of them, they would be exchanging services; but
they should not be taxed on that exchange. Another example of activi-
ties that fall within a noncommercial zone is the existence of baby-
sitting clubs in which parents sit for each other's children under a kind
of barter arrangement. In the author's view, those exchanges are not
squarely in the commercial sphere and so should not be taxed. On the
other hand, bartered exchanges can become so structured and substan-
tial that they represent more than joint activities. In that case, the par-
ties will have moved into the commercial sphere, and their bartered ex-
change will be taxable.
When a part of an individual's body is damaged or destroyed,
what has been taken from that individual is something that is predomi-
nantly of a noncommercial nature. It is true that an individual can use
his arms, legs, eyes, ears etc. in commercial ventures, but body parts
themselves are universally regarded as personal and noncommercial.
Since humans are engaged in commercial activities, their bodies and
their personal attributes will be inexorably entwined with those activi-
ties. But, an individual's body and personal attributes are merely used
in commercial activities; they are not detached and sold in the market
place. It would be a rare person that would contemplate the sale of his
body parts to be removed from him while he is still alive. If such a
transaction were to take place, then the individual will have committed
the sale of that body part to a commercial venture, and there is no
reason for the tax law to exempt the gain from taxation, and it does not
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (as amended in 1989).
40. There is no statute or regulation that provides for the exclusion from taxation of spousal
exchange of services. 26 U.S.C. § 1041, which was added to the Code in 1984, precludes the
recognition of gain or loss on an interspousal transfer of property, it does not address the tax
consequences of exchanging services. Unlike property exchanges, the Commissioner has never
sought to tax interspousal exchanges of services, and the exclusion of such exchanges is part of
the common law of taxation.
19951
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do so. However, if a body part is destroyed or injured, the compensa-
tion that the victim receives is not the product of his having voluntarily
committed that part to a commercial sale. It is true that the victim must
actively seek reparations in order to be compensated; but, that is a
consequence of the injury and does not represent a voluntary entrance
into the commercial market.
2. Vulturous behavior
Perhaps the most important consideration that weighs against
taxing such damages is the heartlessness of the government's profiting
from the tort law's attempt to soften the injury that a victim has
suffered. The dollar damages that a victim receives are not truly
substitutes for what was lost but, at most, constitute some mitigation of
it. Much of the victim's loss is not monetary, but only monetary
damages can be given because no substitute is available to replace what
was lost. If the government were to tax damages received for the loss
of a body part (or for the death of a relative), it would seem to many
to have engaged in a vulturous act-analogous to feeding off of the
flesh of a dismembered arm or leg or off of the corpse of a recently
departed.
The compassionate motivation for the exclusion has much greater
force when the victim suffers a physical injury (and possibly an injury
to mental health). But, even as to physical injuries, not all of them are
severe, and a minor injury (such as a sprained ankle) does not create so
much sympathy that it makes the taxation of damages received for that
injury unpalatable." Nevertheless, the exclusion of damages received
for minor physical injuries detracts very little from the validity of the
theory that avoiding the appearance of vulturous behavior is a major
justification for the exclusion. While having no empirical data, the
author's intuition is that most of the dollars obtained as damages and
settlements for physical injuries involve a serious harm. The cost of
obtaining damages for a minor injury will preclude many persons from
prosecuting their claim, and those who do pursue the matter will obtain
a small amount. Since the amount of damages that a taxpayer will re-
ceive for a minor injury will be small, it is not worth the administrative
hassle to establish and enforce criteria that would attempt to distinguish
41. See Martin Burke & Michael Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal
Injury Awards; The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13, 43-44 (1989) in which those authors
make that observation.
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between major and minor physical injuries. Consequently, the sympa-
thy that is aroused for major physical injuries spills over to provide
relief for the sufferer of a minor injury. It is not uncommon that the
compelling concerns that cause the adoption of a relief provision also
will benefit a limited number of persons who fall within the scope of
the remedial provision even though their plight is not the one that
triggered its adoption. Taxation is a practical enterprise, and it is not
practical to seek to operate the tax system so as to have every provi-
sion apply only to those on whose behalf it was passed.
The "compassionate" justification and the "return of human capi-
tal" justification for the exclusion apply more readily to damages for
noneconomic injuries than to damages for lost income.42 Perhaps the
most compelling reason for excluding lost income damages is that such
damages should not be separated from the general damages provided
for the victim because the total sum of such damages merely mitigate
the victim's personal loss and do not fully compensate him for it. The
fact that, as part of the effort to arrive at a just figure of dollar com-
pensation, the courts utilize an estimate of the amount of income lost
by the victim, does not change the nature of the total compensation
package. When a victim suffers a physical injury, there is no way to
measure the dollar amount of his loss, and the courts can do no more
than resort to some conventional devices to arrive at a reasonable
amount of mitigation. One of the devices utilized for that purpose is to
estimate the amount of income that the victim has lost. The measure-
ment of lost income lends respectability to the enterprise in that it
suggests a greater amount of mathematical precision than otherwise
exists. Also, income loss is one of the few aspects of the victim's loss
(medical expenses being another) that relate to money. Since money is
all that can be granted to the victim, it is understandable that tort law
would seize on a money loss as a measure of part of what must be paid
to the victim. This fact should not obscure what damage awards are all
about.
3. Author's conclusions
In the author's view, the noncommercial and nonmonetary nature
of a body part that was destroyed or injured, and the vulturous portrait
that the government's profiting from a personal tragedy would paint,
42. Kahn, supra note 6. The justification for excluding damages for lost income is discussed
in Subpart IlI H of the author's Florida Tax Review article.
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explain why a suggestion that the damages for such an injury be taxed
typically is met with a vigorous renunciation. A body part is not per-
ceived as a commercial item; the taxpayer never sought to commercial-
ize its value by selling it, and the damages paid to the taxpayer miti-
gate the loss of a personal attribute the appreciated value of which
never would have been taxed if the injury had not occurred. The dam-
ages received for the loss of a body part are widely viewed as mitiga-
tion of the victim's loss. A diversion of a portion of those damages to
the Government would impair that mitigation. While a strict application
of such tax concepts as "basis" and the "measurement of gain" lead to
the taxation of such receipts, the countervailing considerations are very
strong. As with many tax law provisions, the appropriateness of retain-
ing them depends upon value judgments.
On the other hand, the case for excluding damages received for
nonphysical injuries (other perhaps than for mental damage) is less
compelling. The plight of a person who suffers exclusively nonphysical
injuries does not arouse the same degree of sympathy that attaches to a
victim who suffers a serious physical injury. A nonphysical injury
appears far less "tragic" than does a serious physical injury. The taxa-
tion of damages received for nonphysical injuries, therefore, does not
create the rapacious image that characterizes a tax on damages received
for a serious physical injury. Nevertheless, despite the Commissioner's
original contention to the contrary, it has been established for some 23
years that § 104(a)(2) excludes from income damages received for
nonphysical injuries as well as those for physical injuries. 3 However,
a recently adopted statute limits § 104(a)(2) to damages (other than
punitive damages) received pursuant to a claim that had its origin in a
physical injury or physical sickness.'
IV. THE BURKE DECISION
One issue that was the subject of frequent litigation (but which
was resolved by the 1996 Act) is whether damages received by the vic-
43. The Internal Revenue Service initially ruled that the statutory exclusion applied only to
damages received for physical injuries. E.g., Sol. Mer. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920) (holding that
damages for alienation of affection, although a personal injury, are taxable; Sol. Mem. 957, 1 C.B.
65 (1919) (holding that damages for defamation are taxable). Since 1972, the statute has been
construed as applying to damages received for nonphysical injuries. See Seay v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 32 (1972), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 3. Any question concerning the statute's application to pre-1996
non-physical injuries was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S.
229 (1992).
44. Section 1605(a) of the SMALL BUSINESS JOB PROTECTION ACT OF 1996.
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tims of discrimination are excluded from income by § 104(a)(2). The
Supreme Court cast a new light on that issue, albeit not a very helpful
one, in its 1992 decision in Burke. Since then, the issue was totally
restructured as a consequence of the Court's decision in Schleier and
finally resolved by the 1996 Act. Before discussing Schleier, let us
examine the Burke decision, the significance of which extends far
beyond discrimination damages.
In United States v. Burke,4 the Court addressed the question of
whether damages received under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19646 (as it read prior to the 1991 amendment) because of sex dis-
crimination were excluded from gross income by § 104(a)(2). The
damages at issue in Burke were for back wages that the taxpayers had
failed to earn because of the discriminatory acts of the employer.
For purposes of § 104(a)(2), Treasury's regulations provide that
the term "'damages received' . . . means an amount received...
through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort
type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of
such prosecution."47 Only damages (or settlements) received pursuant
to a claim that qualifies as a tort or a tort-type right can be excluded
under § 104(a)(2).4 For that reason, a number of courts, including the
Supreme Court, have held that a crucial test for § 104(a)(2) exclusion
is to determine the nature of the claim underlying the taxpayer's receipt
of damages or a settlement. 9
In Burke, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the regulatory requirement
that for damages to be within the scope of the statutory exclusion, the
claim on which the damages were obtained must be tort or tort-type."0
The principal contribution of the Burke decision was to set forth crite-
ria for determining whether a claim is tort or tort-type. The Court held
that the characterization of a claim as tort or tort-type depends upon the
breadth of the remedies that the applicable law provides for such
claims.5 The Court noted that common law (and current state laws)
permit a wide range of remedies for victims of torts." A recovery is
45. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
46. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1994))
[hereinafter Title VIIi.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
48. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
49. Burke, 504 U.S. at 234; Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299.
50. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 235-37.
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permitted for lost wages or profits, medical expenses, and diminished
future earning capacity. 3 In addition to allowing recovery for pecuni-
ary losses, tort laws also permit a recovery for such nonpecuniary items
as: pain and suffering, emotional or mental distress, personal humilia-
tion, mental anguish, and suffering.54 The Court also noted that puni-
tive or exemplary damages are generally available if the wrongdoer's
conduct was intentional or reckless.55 The Court held that if the reme-
dies provided for a specific violation of an individual's rights are sig-
nificantly narrower than those typically made available to victims of
torts, the damages or settlement obtained by a victim whose rights of
that type were violated are not based on a tort or tort-type claim; and,
so, the amounts received thereunder are taxable.56
At the time that the facts of Burke arose, the remedies provided
for Title VII violations were exclusively to compensate for lost wages
and to permit equitable relief for reinstatement or elevation to a job.57
The Court held that the range of damages that was then available to a
claimant under Title VII rights was too restricted to qualify the
taxpayers' claims as ones for tort or tort-type rights.58 Accordingly, al-
though the taxpayers did suffer an injury, the range of available rem-
edies permitted by Title VII was insufficient to qualify a victim's rights
under that provision as a claim for damages for a "personal injury"
within the meaning of § 104(a)(2). Hence, the Court held that the dam-
ages that the taxpayers received are taxable.59 The Court contrasted
the remedies provided at that time by Title VII with the broad range of
remedies provided by other antidiscrimination statutes." For example,
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides a broad range of remedies for victims of
race-based employment discrimination. While the Court noted that Title
VII was amended in 1991 to provide a broad range of remedies for cer-
tain types of violations, the facts of the Burke case arose prior to the
effective date of that amendment, and so the Court did not pass upon
53. Id. at 235.
54. Burke, 504 U.S. at 236-37.
55. Id. at 237. The Court listed the right to a jury trial as usually being made available to
victims of torts. Id. However, the presence or absence of a right to a jury trial is not a significant
factor, and the availability of a jury trial was given little or no weight in the Court's decision in
Schleier. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166.
56. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241-42.
57. Id. at 238-39.
58. Id. at 241-42.
59. Id. at 242.
60. Burke, 504 U.S. at 240.
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the effect that the amendment has on the treatment of such damages
that are received after the amendment.6 The state of the excludibility
of Title VII damages under the Burke doctrine, but before Schleier and
the 1996 Amendment changed it, is discussed below.
There are two different types of discrimination that are proscribed
by Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964.62 One type is the dispa-
rate treatment of employees where the employer has the intent to dis-
criminate against an individual, with respect to compensation or other
employment terms, because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex
or national origin (a "disparate treatment" violation). The second type
(the "disparate impact" violation) is facially neutral employment prac-
tices that are not necessary for business purposes and that have a dispa-
rate impact on persons within a protected classification (for example,
persons within a group classified by race or gender). A violation of the
second type occurs when a practice of the employer has no bona fide
business justification and has a disparate impact on members of a pro-
tected group. There is no requirement that the employer have intended
that result.6376
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added a new section (section 1981a)
to Title VII that expanded the range of relief that can be granted for
violations of the disparate treatment type of prohibited discrimination -
i.e., it applies to intentional acts of discrimination by an employer. In
such cases, compensatory damages can be awarded for nonpecuniary
injuries, and punitive damages can be awarded in certain cases. But,
this provision does not apply to disparate impact cases; the exclusive
relief available in those cases, back pay and equitable relief, remains
unchanged.
The Court did not state in Burke that a determination that a claim
was tort or tort-type is sufficient to exclude damages received thereun-
der from income. What the Court did hold was that a tort or tort-type
claim is a necessary condition to excludibility. 4 However, subject to a
few exceptions, a number of courts and the Commissioner concluded
61. Id. at 241 n.12.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
63. For a discussion of the Title VII provisions that apply to employment discrimination and
of the remedies that are permitted to be granted to victims of violations of those provisions, see
Arthur W. Andrews, The Taxation of Title VII Victims After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 TAx
LAW. 755, 768-70 (1993).
64. Burke, 504 U.S. at 242.
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that Burke made the existence of a tort or tort-type claim sufficient for
exclusion as well as being a necessary element.65
What then became of the statutory requirement that damages be
received on account of a personal injury or sickness to be excludible?
That requirement was not entirely stricken by Burke, but its signifi-
cance was reduced. At a minimum, unless the act for which damages
were received caused a personal injury, the exclusion would not apply.
This means that damages received for an injury to taxpayer's property
is not excluded. Even if the same act of the wrongdoer caused both
personal injury and property damage, the damages received for the loss
of property are not excluded. So, to that extent, the post-Burke and pre-
Schleier construction of the statute required that an examination be
made of the type of injury for which the damage was received. Howev-
er, property damage was not the only instance in which such an exami-
nation was necessary. The courts divided over the question of whether
punitive damages could be excluded if they were given in connection
with a personal injury.' As we shall see, a majority of the federal
courts of appeals held that punitive damages are taxable; but, one court
of appeals excluded punitive damages from gross income.67 According
to the majority view, the noncompensatory nature of the damage meant
that it was not received on account of a personal injury and so was not
excluded by the statute. The post-Burke decisions that excluded puni-
tive damages from income relied in part on a reading of Burke that
made the nature of the damage award irrelevant so long as it stemmed
from a claim based on a personal injury.68 Prior to Schleier, the courts
also divided over the question of whether a damage award for prejudg-
ment interest was excludible, but it now appears to be settled that pre-
judgment interest is taxable.6
65. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994); Downey v. Commissioner, 33
F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
66. Compare Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Wesson v. United
States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994) (2-1
decision), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 648 (1994); Reese v. Commissioner, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding punitive damages to be taxable) with Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th
Cir. 1994) (divided decision) (holding punitive damages to be excluded from income). Subsequent
to Schleier, the courts have uniformly held that punitive damages are taxable, and the issue cur-
rently is pending before the Supreme Court. E.g., Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995)
(reviewed by the court); O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
67. See cases cited supra note 66.
68. E.g., Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 97 (1993) (reviewed by the court), affid, 33
F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994) (2-1 decision).
69. Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124 (1993) (reviewed by the court) (holding that
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Apart from those several exceptions described above, after Burke
was decided and prior to Schleier, courts and the Commissioner ig-
nored the type or nature of the damage that a taxpayer received and
instead made the nature of the taxpayer's claim the exclusive focus of
their decisions.
For example, in McKay v. Commissioner,' the taxpayer had been
an officer of a corporation, and his employer terminated his employ-
ment.7 Taxpayer sued his former employer for wrongful discharge
and for a breach of the employment contract.72 After a trial and a jury
verdict for the taxpayer, the parties settled the dispute.73 Under the
settlement agreement, the employer agreed to pay taxpayer
$16,744,300, of which: more than $12,000,000 was for the claim for
wrongful discharge, more than $2,000,000 was for the breach of con-
tract claim, and the balance was partial reimbursement of various legal
and litigation costs. 74 Relying on Burke, the Tax Court held that the
more than $12,000,000 that taxpayer received for his wrongful dis-
charge claim is excluded from income because wrongful discharge
constitutes a tort claim.75 It is difficult to see how an injury incurred
because of a wrongful discharge can be classified as a "personal injury
or sickness," but the Tax Court's decision ignored that statutory re-
quirement on the apparent assumption that Burke had subsumed that re-
quirement in its determination that damages received on a tort or tort-
type claim are excludible. As we will see, the Supreme Court's subse-
quent decision in Schleier vitiates the approach taken by the Tax Court
in McKay, and the Fifth Circuit vacated the Tax Court's decision on
the basis that it was contrary to Schleier.76
Another striking example of the assumption that the tort or tort-
type claim requirement is sufficient for excludibility is the two deci-
prejudgment interest is taxable), affd, (without published opinion) 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 424 (1994). While a district court held in Brabson v. United States, 859 F.
Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994) that prejudgment interest is excludible from income, the Tenth Circuit
reversed and held that prejudgment interest is taxable. The Tenth Circuit relied in part on the
Schleier decision for its reversal. Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 1996).
70. 102 T.C. 465, 469 (1994), rev'd 84 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 1996).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 470.
73. Id.
74. McKay, 102 T.C. at 472.
75. Id. at 485.
76. See 102 T.C. 465 (1994), rev'd, 84 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 1996).
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sions of the district court of Kansas in O'Gilvie v. United States
(O'Gilvie I)7 and O'Gilvie v. United States (O'Gilvie 1J).78
The first decision of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Kansas in O'Gilvie I granted the Government's motion for
summary judgment and held that punitive damages obtained in a
wrongful death action are taxable.79 The court held that, even though
the taxpayer's underlying claim was in tort, punitive damages serve no
compensatory purpose and so are not received "on account of personal
injury"", and, therefore, are not excluded from income by § 104(a)(2).
O'Gilvie I was decided the same day that the Supreme Court promul-
gated its Burke decision, and so the district court did not have that
decision before it when the court granted the Government's summary
judgment.
The taxpayer in O'Gilvie moved for reconsideration so that the
district court could consider the relevance of the Supreme Court's
decision in Burke." In O'Gilvie H, the district court granted the mo-
tion for reconsideration and changed its decision entirely.82 Relying on
its reading of Burke, the district court determined that it had erred in its
prior ruling by focusing on the nature of the punitive damage award
rather than on the nature of the underlying claim. Since the underlying
claim was tort-type, the court stated that "the court believes its previ-
ous order is contrary to Burke and must be reversed."83 The court
granted summary judgment for the taxpayer. 4 On appeal, in what
might be called O'Gilvie III, the Tenth Circuit (in a decision made
subsequent to Schleier) reversed the district court and held that punitive
damages are taxable.85 It now appears that there will be an O'Gilvie
IV since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in that case. 6
77. See 70 AFTR 2d 92-5069 (D. Kan. 1992) [hereinafter O'Gilvie !] rev'd, 66 F.3d 1550
(10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1360 (1996).
78. 71 AFFR 2d 93-547 (D. Kan. 1992) [hereinafter O'Gilvie I/] rev'd, 66 F.3d 1550 (10th
Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1360 (1996).
79. O'Gilvie 1, 70 AFTR 2d at 92-5072.
80. Id.
81. O'Gilvie 1I, 71 AFrR 2d at 93-547.
82. Id. at 93-548.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter O'Gilvie III], cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
86. O'Gilvie v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
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The federal courts of appeals divided over the question of whether
punitive damages can be excluded by § 104(a)(2). Prior to Schleier,
four courts of appeals held that they are taxable, and the Sixth Circuit
excluded them.17 Two issues raised by the question of whether puni-
tive damages can be excluded are whether such damages are obtained
on account of a personal injury or sickness, and whether that is a re-
quirement of excludibility. We will address those issues and the effect
that Schleier has on their resolution later in this article.
As a consequence of Burke, the Commissioner acknowledged in
Revenue Ruling 93-88 that compensatory damages obtained for race-
based discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and compensatory dam-
ages received under the amended version of Title VII for disparate
treatment type of discrimination will be excluded from income."
However, even in that ruling, the Commissioner noted that damages re-
ceived under Title VII for a disparate impact type of violation are
taxable because of the limited range of remedies available for those
claims. 9 Like the several cases discussed above, in promulgating that
revenue ruling, the Commissioner read Burke as establishing that the
satisfaction of the tort or tort-type requirement is sufficient to provide
excludibility. In Schleier, the Supreme Court was critical of that reve-
nue ruling and effectively repudiated it.' We will explore the status of
damages received because of discrimination later in this article.
As can be seen from the discussion above, the standard established
by Burke led to incongruous distinctions and results. Damages received
because of a wrongful discharge were held to be excludible if the claim
was treated as a tort but not if it was treated as a contract claim. Dam-
ages received for some types of discrimination claims were excludible
and others were not.
Moreover, the Burke standards encouraged manipulative settle-
ments to obtain advantageous tax treatment. For example, if an em-
87. Compare Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Wesson v. United
States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994) (2-1
decision), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 648 (1994); Reese v. Commissioner, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding punitive damages to be taxable) with Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th
Cir. 1994) (divided decision) (holding punitive damages to be excluded from income).
88. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 Cum. Bull. 61. In that same ruling, the Commissioner acknowl-
edged that damages received under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (1994)) are excluded from income. As a consequence of Schleier, Rev. Rul. 93-
88 was suspended by the Commissioner in I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B. 20.
89. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
90. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 n.8 (1995). The Service then suspended Rev. Rul. 93-88 as a
consequence of the Schleier decision. I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B. 20.
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ployer wished to pay a senior employee to retire, the employee might
instead sue for alleged discrimination on some ground or another and
then settle that suit for a tax-free payment of damages. While the au-
thor has no data that this has occurred,9 accounts of such occurrences
did circulate among some law firms. Regardless of whether those ac-
counts were accurate, the availability of that course of action was too
tempting to doubt that it would take place. Having set the stage as it
existed at the time that Schleier reached the Supreme Court, let us now
turn to that case.
V. THE SCHLEIER DECISION
Commissioner v. Schleier9 involved the question of the excludi-
bility of damages received in settlement of a claim under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967"3 (hereinafter often referred to
as the "ADEA"). The ADEA permits an award for lost wages.94 The
ADEA also permits an award for an equal amount as liquidated dam-
ages but only in the case of willful violations.95 The ADEA does not
permit an award to be made for pain and suffering or for emotional
distress.96 The ADEA does provide for a jury trial.97
The taxpayer in Schleier obtained a settlement from his former
employer for his discharge based on his age.98 One-half of the
taxpayer's settlement was for lost wages, and the other half was for
liquidated damages.99 The Supreme Court had previously determined
in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston"° that the liquidated dam-
ages provision in the ADEA constitutes punitive damages, and the
Court adhered to that determination in Schleier. The Supreme Court (in
91. But, see, the facts of the recent case of Taggi v. United States, 35 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.
1994), that lend credibility to the suggestion that this was taking place. See also, Loren C.
Rosenzweig, Careful Planning May Establish Excludability of Damages Awarded For Age Dis-
crimination, 81 J. TAX'N 254 (1994) for the suggestion (made prior to Schleier) that settlements
for the termination of employment should be structured to have the maximum amount that is
feasible characterized as a settlement of a tort claim.
92. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994).
95. Id.
96. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994).
98. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162.
99. Id.
100. 469 U.S. I I (1985).
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a 6-3 decision) concluded that all of the damages that the taxpayer
received are included in his gross income and are taxable.'
There are several important features of the Court's decision in
Schleier. One of these is the Court's adherence to and application of
the Burke standard for determining whether a claim is tort or tort-type.
Two more important features of the case are: (1) the Court's determina-
tion that the "tort or tort-type" requirement"2 is merely one of two
requisites for excludibility under the statute, and (2) the Court's estab-
lishment and description of the second requisite for excludibility. 03
Before examining the second requisite that the Court established, let us
consider the Court's application of the Burke requisite.'"
In Schleier, the Supreme Court adhered to the views that it pro-
mulgated in Burke that a claim must be tort or tort-type for damages to
be excluded and that a claim does not so qualify unless the applicable
law provides a broad range of remedies for the claimant. 105 The Court
held that the remedies provided by the ADEA are not sufficiently broad
to qualify claims thereunder as tort or tort-type, and so the taxpayer's
case failed under the Burke standard." The ADEA's provision allow-
ing an award for back pay is the same type of remedy that the Court
had previously found in Burke to be insufficient to classify a claim as
tort or tort-type.0 7 The principal difference from the facts of Burke is
that the ADEA allowed punitive damages (described in the Act as
"liquidated damages") for willful violations and permitted a jury trial.
The Court held that the addition of a punitive damage remedy and of a
jury trial (together with allowing back pay) was not a broad enough
range of remedies to qualify an ADEA claim as tort or tort-type.'
This holding is significant in that it indicates that the range of available
remedies must be extensive for a claim to qualify for § 104(a)(2) treat-
ment.
The Court's application of the Burke standard was sufficient to
defeat the taxpayer's claim for exclusion. But, the Court went much
101. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
102. This requirement is set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) and was adopted in Burke
where the Supreme Court elaborated on the standard to be applied in determining whether a claim
is tort or tort-type.
103. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166.
104. See supra note 101.
105. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
106. Id.
107. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241.
108. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
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further than that and made the application of the Burke standard merely
an alternative holding. Obviously displeased with the assumption that
compliance with the Burke standard was sufficient to invoke the exclu-
sion provided by § 104(a)(2), the Court expressly repudiated that
view." The Court held that the tort or tort-type claim requirement is
merely one of two conditions that must be satisfied for damages to be
excluded."' In addition to there being a tort claim, a damage will not
be excluded unless it is obtained on account of a personal injury."'
Let us now turn to this second requirement and examine what it is and
how it operates.
Schleier holds that the receipt of a damage payment cannot be
excluded unless the loss or injury for which the payment is made is
attributable to a personal injury. A single wrongful act can cause multi-
ple injuries. Only those damages that are received as compensation for
losses that are attributable to a personal injury can be excluded.
The Court utilized the following hypothetical example to illustrate
this concept." 2 An individual suffers a physical injury in an automo-
bile accident that is caused by another's negligence. In settlement of
the resulting lawsuit, the individual receives $X for medical expenses,
$Y for lost wages (both past wages and reduced future earnings), and
$Z for pain and suffering. The individual had not previously claimed a
tax deduction for the medical expenses. The $X that the individual re-
ceived for medical expenses and the $Z that the individual received for
pain and suffering are attributable to the personal injury that the indi-
vidual suffered - i.e., absent a personal injury, the individual would
not have incurred the medical expenses or incurred pain and suffering,
and so the damages for those items are received on account of the
personal injury. Consequently, those amounts are excluded from gross
income by § 104(a)(2). If the $Y that the individual received for lost
income (including reduced future earnings) are attributable to the per-
sonal injury that the individual suffered, that amount also will be ex-
cluded. For example, if the individual were a surgeon who lost fingers
in the accident, the individual's lost income (both past and future) is a
consequence of the loss of his fingers, and so the damages received
therefor is received on account of the individual's personal injury.
109. Id. at 2166.
110. Id. at 2167.
111. Id.
112. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163-64.
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In contrast, consider the case of the taxpayer in Schleier who was
fired because of his age in contravention of the ADEA. The improper
action of taxpayer's employer in firing the taxpayer caused multiple
injuries. One injury that the taxpayer suffered was the humiliation and
emotional pain from being stigmatized as unfit." 3 That was a person-
al injury. A second injury he suffered was the loss of the income that
he would have earned had he been allowed to continue his employ-
ment." 4 That loss constitutes an improper termination of an economic
relationship; therefore, it is an economic injury, not a personal injury.
The damages paid to taxpayer for back wages that he was prevented
from earning were not attributable to his personal injury. Even if the
taxpayer had not felt any humiliation or emotional pain because of the
firing, he would have been entitled to precisely the same amount of
damages he received for back wages. The personal injury that taxpayer
suffered was a product of the same act that caused his economic loss,
but it was a separate and distinct injury. "' The circumstance of the
injured surgeon in the hypothetical discussed in the paragraph above
was quite different. The surgeon would not have lost any income if he
had not suffered a personal injury in the accident. The lost income is
directly attributable to that personal injury. When a personal injury is
caused by a wrongful act, any damages resulting from that personal
injury may be excluded. But when a wrongful act causes both a per-
sonal injury and an economic injury that is separate and distinct from
the personal injury, then damages received for the latter cannot be
excluded under § 104(a)(2).
As previously noted, the Court characterized the liquidated damag-
es that the taxpayer in Schleier received as punitive damages."6 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the liquidated damages were not received
on account of a personal injury and so are not excluded. "' The Court
113. Id. at 2164.
114. Id. at 2164-65.
115. The Court stated in Schleier
Whether one treats respondent's attaining the age of 60 or his being laid off on account
of his age as the proximate cause of respondent's loss of income, neither the birthday
nor the discharge can fairly be described as a 'personal injury' or 'sickness.' Moreover,
though respondent's unlawful termination may have caused some psychological or
'personal' injury comparable to the intangible pain and suffering caused by an automo-
bile accident, it is clear that no part of respondent's recovery of back wages is attribut-
able to that injury.
Id. at 2164.
116. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165.
117. Id.
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did state that if the liquidated damages had been intended by Congress
to compensate for personal injuries that were difficult to prove, they
"might well come within § 104(a)(2)'s exclusion."'18 One might ques-
tion the desirability of having the tax treatment of a damage award rest
on a determination of the legislative purpose for providing that remedy;
but that is one of the less attractive elements of the Court's decision.
The proper treatment of liquidated damages is discussed in Part VI.
If the ADEA had allowed damages to be awarded for pain and
suffering, and if that added item were deemed sufficient to make a
claim under the ADEA a tort or tort-type claim," 9 then damages re-
ceived by the taxpayer for pain and suffering would be received on
account of a personal injury, and so would be excluded from income.
However, even in that case, the damages received for back pay and the
liquidated damages would be taxable because neither of those were re-
ceived for a personal injury.
While Schleier is an extremely significant decision that sets a new
and clearer path for determining the tax treatment of damages, it does
not constitute a radical departure from prior law, including the Burke
decision. As noted previously, even after Burke was decided, there
were circumstances in which the nature of a damage payment had to be
examined to determine whether it was excludible even when the under-
lying claim was a tort or tort-type. The clearest example of this is
where a wrongful act caused both a property damage and a personal
injury. For example, consider an automobile accident in which the
victim suffered both a personal injury and damage to his vehicle. Even
though the same wrongful act caused both injuries, the damages ob-
tained for the property loss are not excluded by § 104(a)(2), but the
damages obtained for the personal injury are excluded. Another exam-
ple is where the victim of a personal injury obtains both compensatory
and punitive damages. While the courts divided on the issue, the clear
trend favored taxing the punitive damages. 2° This again requires an
examination of the nature of the damage award rather than relying
exclusively on the nature of the underlying claim. The post-Schleier
status of punitive damages is discussed in Part VI of this article.
118. Id. Of course, to be excludible, the claim on which the damage is payable must qualify
as a tort or tort-type claim.
119. Id. The tort or tort-type claim classification is necessary to satisfy that requirement (the
Burke requirement) of the statute.
120. See cases cited supra note 66.
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In Schleier, the Court substantially expanded the requirement that
the nature of a damage payment must be examined. However, the con-
cept of tying the tax treatment of a damage payment to the question of
whether it was attributable to a personal injury existed long before
Schleier was decided.
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Schleier is divided into two
parts.' 2' The first part, which is not a model of clarity, seems to be
based on the contention that if an act causes a personal injury, then all
compensatory damages obtained because of that act constitute damages
received on account of a personal injury. Justice O'Connor simply
passes over the fact that one act can cause more than one injury, and
that the majority's holding requires that the damage received be charac-
terized by the injury that caused the loss for which compensation is ob-
tained. Justice O'Connor expresses bewilderment over the majority's
distinction of damages incurred in a car accident from those incurred
by the taxpayer, and she suggests that the only basis on which those
two can be taxed differently is if the majority implicitly treats nonphys-
ical injuries differently from physical injuries.'22 Whatever the merits
might be of providing different tax treatment for damages received for
physical and nonphysical injuries, the majority's decision does not do
so and does not establish standards that will prevent an exclusion of
damages for nonphysical injuries. As shown in Part VI, the Schleier de-
cision excludes from income certain types of damages (such as pain
and suffering) that are obtained in claims based on dignitary torts (in-
cluding discrimination claims based on a tort or tort-type claim). Even
damages for lost income that are obtained on a defamation claim are
excludible under the majority's standard. This first part of Justice
O'Connor's dissent was joined by only one other Justice (Justice
Thomas).'23 Justice Souter joined only in the second part of that dis-
sent.'24
The second part of Justice O'Connor's dissent concludes that the
ADEA provides for a tort or tort-type claim and that the Burke decision
and a 35-year consistent administrative construction of § 104(a)(2)
made the tort or tort-type character of a claim decisive in determining
the excludibility of damages."2 Justices Thomas and Souter joined in
121. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2169-70.
123. Id. at 2167.
124. Id.
125. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1995] 331
HeinOnline  -- 15 QLR 331 1995-1996
[Vol. 15:305
that part of the dissent. 26 In addition to urging the adoption of a
broader construction of what constitutes a tort, this part of the dissent
rests on a plea for an application of stare decisis and for upholding the
administrative position that purportedly has been followed in the most
recent period. The dissent fails to give the majority credit for making a
desirable modification to a judicially created standard27 that was
proving to be unworkable and highly unsatisfactory from a tax policy
viewpoint. As previously observed, using the Burke standard as the sole
requirement for exclusion led to the drawing of arbitrary distinctions
and led to the exclusion of certain items when there was no tax policy
justification for not taxing them. The Schleier decision represents a
movement in the right direction in that the tax results it generates are
more consistent with tax policy considerations than are prior rules.
Moreover, the historical pattern of the tax treatment of damages is
not as consistent as the dissent pictures it. There have been a number
of vacillations and reversals of position. For example, the Service has
contended that punitive damages are taxable (although, even as to that,
there was a period of some nine years, from 1975 to 1984, in which
the Service excluded punitive damages from income). 2' That admin-
istrative position (which has been adopted by a majority of the courts
of appeal129 that have faced the issue) contravenes the view that the
nature of damages is irrelevant to the determination of its excludibility.
Over the years, the Service and the courts have changed their positions
concerning the excludibility of a number of different types of damages.
126. Id. at 2167.
127. While Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) created the "tort or tort-type" standard, that regulation
does not make that standard the exclusive test for applying § 104(a)(2). The regulation uses that
standard to define the meaning of "damages received (whether by suit or agreement)." The regula-
tion is silent as to the meaning of the statutory requirement that the damages be received "on
account of personal injuries or sickness." The elevation of the "tort or tort-type" requisite to an
exclusive status is attributable to some (but not all) judicial decisions construing § 104(a)(2). Al-
though, in Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, the Internal Revenue Service granted a much greater
role to the "tort or tort-type" requirement than it had done previously, that construction was based
on the Internal Revenue Service's reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Burke. The majority
opinion in Schleier explicitly repudiated the broad reading of Burke that the Internal Revenue
Service had adopted in that 1993 ruling. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
128. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47 reversed the Service's prior position and ruled that
punitive damages are excluded from income. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32 revoked the 1975
ruling and determined that punitive damages are taxable, and that has been the Service's position
ever since. It is noteworthy that even the discredited Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61 ruled only
that compensatory damages received under certain federal statutes barring discrimination were
excludible.
129. See cases cited supra note 66.
QL R
HeinOnline  -- 15 QLR 332 1995-1996
TAXATION OF DAMAGES
For example, the tax treatment of damages received because of dis-
crimination has gone through a number of changes. 3 '
VI. THE POST-SCHLEIER PRE-1996 STATE OF THE LAW
As a consequence of Schleier, it is much easier to predict whether
pre-1996 damages will be taxable. Let us now consider the likely treat-
ment of different types of damages for several different types of inju-
ries.
A. Compensatory Damages for Physical Injuries
Schleier will have little effect (if any) on the treatment of compen-
satory damages obtained for a physical injury. There will be few, if
any, cases of that sort in which the victim's claim will not qualify as a
tort under the Burke and Schleier standards. And, in virtually all such
cases, the damages obtained by the victim (whether by suit or by
agreement) will be attributable to the victim's physical injury and so
will be received on account of a personal injury. The damages covered
by § 104(a)(2) include: lost income (both past and future), pain and
suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, and medical expenses (except
to the extent previously taken as deductions by the victim). The tax
treatment of punitive damages is discussed in Subpart F, below.
B. Damages Obtained Because of Defamation
Schleier also will have little effect on the tax treatment of pre-
1996 compensatory damages obtained in a defamation claim. A claim
based on defamation will be a tort claim. The injury that is incurred
because of defamatory statements is damage to the victim's reputation,
and that is a personal injury. Compensatory damages obtained because
of the defamation, including damages obtained for loss of past and
future income, are directly attributable to the personal injury that the
victim suffered (i.e., the damage to the individual's reputation).
Therefore, all compensatory damages obtained by the victim will be
excluded from gross income by § 104(a)(2). Punitive damages obtained
130. Compare, Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616 (1975); and Coats v. Commissioner, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 1650 (1977), affd by court order, 626 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding such
damages to be taxable); with Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Rickel v.
Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991) [here-
inafter Downey !], aff d on reconsideration, 100 T.C. 634 (1993) (reviewed by the court) [herein-
after Downey II], rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994); Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61 (holding
certain damages for discrimination to be excludible and certain types to be taxable).
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in connection with a defamation claim will be taxable because of the
express provision in § 104 making that taxable.
C. Damages Obtained Because of Discrimination
Some types of discrimination claims will not qualify as tort or
tort-type, and damages received thereunder are not excluded by
§ 104(a)(2). For example, discriminatory impact claims under Title VII
and claims for age discrimination under the ADEA are outside of the
scope of § 104(a)(2). 3' But, the remedies provided for a number of
types of discriminatory claims will qualify those claims as torts. For
example, claims for race based discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
disparate treatment type of discrimination under Title VII, and discrimi-
nation under the Americans with Disabilities Act,1 12 all qualify as tort
or tort-type claims. 33 Once past the tort requirement, the question
arises whether the receipt of a damage payment satisfies the second re-
quirement described in Schleier. Some types of damages will satisfy
that second requirement, and some will not.
Damages obtained for lost income that is attributable to a discrimi-
nation violation will be taxable. The loss of income will not be attribut-
able to the personal injury that the victim suffered - i.e., humiliation,
damage to personal dignity etc. As was determined to be the case in
Schleier, the economic injuries (other than medical expenses) that a
victim of discrimination incurs are attributable to violations of com-
mercial interests; and, so, the damages therefor are not received on ac-
count of a personal injury.'34 However, damages obtained for pain
and suffering, mental anguish, and similar items, and for medical ex-
penses incurred because of those injuries, are attributable to a personal
injury and so can be excluded under § 104(a)(2).'35 The same dis-
criminatory act can cause both the loss of income and personal injuries,
but only the damages obtained for pain and suffering and for mental
anguish and the like are attributable to the personal injury.
131. See, Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, suspended by I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B.
20; and Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
133. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61, suspended by I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B. 20.
While Schleier invalidates the part of that ruling that determined that compensatory damages re-
ceived under those claims is excluded from income by § 104(a)(2), there is no reason to question
the validity of the part of the ruling that determines that claims under those provisions are tort or
tort-type claims.
134. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164.
135. Id. at 2164-65.
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Any punitive damages that are obtained as a consequence of a
discrimination claim are taxable. Even prior to the 1996 Amendment,
§ 104 explicitly precluded the exclusion of punitive damages received
as a consequence of a claim in which the victim suffered no physical
injury or sickness.
D. Damages for Wrongful Discharge or for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Harm
Depending upon the remedies provided by the applicable local
law, some claims based on a wrongful discharge will constitute a tort
claim and some will not. If the claim does not qualify as a tort claim,
the damages obtained thereunder are taxable. Even when the claim
does satisfy the tort requirement, compensatory damages received for
lost income will be taxable for the same reasons as were explained
above in connection with the receipt of damages for lost income in a
discrimination case." Any punitive damages will be taxable.
Frequently, a claim for damages for a wrongful discharge will be
coupled with a claim for damages for intentional infliction of emotional
harm. Any pre-1996 damages obtained for emotional harm are attrib-
utable to a personal injury. Therefore, if the tort claim requirement is
satisfied, pre-1996 damages obtained for emotional harm or like inju-
ries, whether such damages are allowed pursuant to a wrongful dis-
charge claim or pursuant to an intentional infliction of emotional harm
claim, will be excluded by § 104(a)(2). The extent to which Schleier
permits the exclusion of such damages constitutes one of the flaws of
the Schleier approach. It was cured by the 1996 Amendment.
E. Sexual Harassment
A claim for damages based on sexual harassment is a tort claim,
and any compensatory damages acquired thereby are received on ac-
count of a personal injury. All such pre-1996 compensatory damages,
including damages compensating for lost income, will be excluded by
§ 104(a)(2). Compensatory damages received after the 1996 Amend-
ment generally will be taxable. But see the discussion in Subpart F
below. The question of whether punitive damages obtained in such
cases will be excluded from income is also discussed in Subpart F,
below.
136. See, McKay v. Commissioner, 84 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 1996).
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F. Punitive Damages
In 1989, Congress amended § 104(a)(2). That amendment pre-
cludes the application of § 104(a)(2) to punitive damages obtained in
connection with a case in which no physical injury or sickness oc-
curred. Subject to transition rules, the amendment applies to punitive
damages received after July 10, 1989. So, there is no issue concerning
the taxability of punitive damages received after that date when the
claim is based on a dignitary tort or some other tort in which the vic-
tim did not incur a physical injury. With one minor exception, all puni-
tive damages obtained after the 1996 Amendment are taxable.
Unresolved at this time is whether the 1989 Limitation of § 104(a)
applies if the victim suffered only a very minor amount of physical
injury. Is any physical injury sufficient to remove punitive damages
from the prohibition of that 1989 Amendment? Consider a sexual ha-
rassment case in which the victim was pinched and incurred a small
bruise thereby. The bruise would constitute a minuscule part of the
injury suffered by the victim. The question is whether the presence of
some physical injury, no matter how small, is sufficient to remove a
punitive damage award from the statutory prohibition. This question
becomes irrelevant if all punitive damages are taxable, regardless of
whether the last sentence of § 104(a) is applicable. Since, as explained
below, the author has concluded that that is the case, he deems the
applicability of the 1989 Amendment to be irrelevant.
The question of whether punitive damages are taxable has two
separate aspects to be examined. First is the question of whether the
Schleier construction of § 104(a)(2) prevents its application to pre-1996
punitive damages in the absence of other statutory provisions making it
applicable. The second question is whether the 1989 amendment im-
pliedly excludes from income punitive damages received before 1996,
when the victim suffered a physical injury. We will consider both of
those aspects of the issue.
Even a casual reading of Schleier makes it clear that § 104(a)(2)
does not apply to pre-1996 punitive damages. Such damages are given
to punish a wrongdoer for willful or wantonly wrongful behavior.
While the severity of the victim's injury often can be taken into ac-
count in determining the size of punitive damages to be awarded, it is
used as a means of measuring the degree of the wrongdoer's culpabili-
ty. Even criminal sanctions, clearly punitive in nature, take the extent
of the victim's injury into account in assessing the severity of the crime
and the amount of punishment to be inflicted.
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Punitive damages are awarded to the injured party, rather than to
the state, in order to make the victim a kind of private attorney general
by encouraging the victim to enforce the policies of the state by in-
flicting punishment on the wrongdoer.'37 Even if the legislative pur-
pose for permitting a punitive damage award has some compensatory
objective,'38 it will constitute a minor aspect of the legislative pur-
pose, which virtually always will be predominately punitive. A possible
exception is where a state permits only punitive damages to be awarded
for a wrongful death. In that case, damages would reflect a substantial
compensatory objective.
Typically, punitive damages are not provided on account of a
personal injury. Rather, they are provided on account of an excessively
wrongful act. In Schleier itself, the Court held that the liquidated dam-
age provision of the ADEA served as a punitive damage provision and
so was not received "on account of personal injury or sickness." The
decision in Schleier reflects the Court's view that only compensatory
damages can be excluded under § 104(a)(2).
In one respect, punitive damages can be said to be received on
account of a personal injury. A victim cannot obtain punitive damages
unless the victim suffered an injury. If the injury is personal, can the
punitive damages therefore be viewed as attributable to (i.e., received
"on account of") the personal injury? The Fourth Circuit, in a pre-
Schleier decision, rejected that view;' 9 but the Sixth Circuit felt
differently." At this date, five circuit courts of appeals (the Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits) have held punitive damages
to be taxable, and only the Sixth Circuit disagreed.' 4 In a reviewed
decision in Bagley v. Commissioner,42 the Tax Court unanimously
overruled its prior decision in Horton and held that Schleier requires a
determination that punitive damages are taxable. It seems to the author
that any doubts concerning the taxability of punitive damages are laid
to rest by the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in SchleierY13 In
137. See Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages, Towards a Principled Approach,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 649-50 (1980).
138. See, e.g., Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1994) (2-1 decision) find-
ing a compensatory element in the punitive damage provision there-involved.
139. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
140. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994) (2-1 decision).
141. See cases cited supra note 66. In addition to those cases, the Tenth Circuit held in
O'Gilvie III that punitive damages are taxable. O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir.
1995).
142. 105 T.C. 396 (1995) (reviewed by the court).
143. Every decision on this issue that was made since Schleier came down has held that puni-
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that opinion, the Court emphasized that the statutory exclusion is aimed
at compensatory remedies.'" The Court went on to point out that the
ADEA provision for liquidated damages "serve no compensatory func-
tion."' 5 Moreover, when the tax policy justifications for the statutory
exclusion of certain damages are examined," there is no possible
justification for excluding punitive damages; and so the statute should
not be read expansively to cover those damages. Also, note that the
title to § 104 reads "Compensation For Injuries or Sickness" (emphasis
added), and the items listed in § 104(a)(1) and in (a)(3)-(5) all apply to
compensatory receipts. The meaning of § 104(a)(2) is illuminated by
the title of that statute and by the nature of the subsections that sur-
round § 104 (a)(2).
Perhaps, if it could be shown that the legislative purpose of per-
mitting a specific damage award that is designated as "punitive" was
primarily compensatory, and so the statute was misidentified by the
legislature in labeling it punitive, the receipt of such a damage might
qualify for the exclusion. Even if that is so, there should be an ex-
tremely heavy burden on the taxpayer to show that the damage item
was mislabelled by the legislature. In the view of the author, it will
virtually never be possible to demonstrate that a designated "punitive"
provision does not have punishment as its predominant purpose (except
possibly for certain wrongful death damages as described above).
The second question concerning the treatment of punitive damages
is whether Congress, by its 1989 amendment, impliedly authorized the
exclusion of punitive damages when the victim suffered a physical
injury. The express statement in the 1989 Amendment of the statute
that punitive damages are not excludible when no physical injury oc-
curred creates a negative inference that punitive damages are excludible
when a physical injury did occur. In footnote 6 of the Burke opinion,
the Court stated in dictum that Congress amended the statute in 1989
to allow the exclusion of punitive damages in cases where there was a
physical injury or sickness. 7 The question of whether Congress's
1989 amendment authorized the exclusion of punitive damages when
there is a physical injury was not before the Court in Burke, and there
is no indication that the Court examined the legislative history of that
tive damages are taxable.
144. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
145. Id. at 2167.
146. See supra part II1.
147. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237 n.6.
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provision or even subjected the provision to scrutiny. A careful reading
of the legislative history of the 1989 amendment makes abundantly
clear that Congress had no intention of making such punitive damages
excludible.
At the time that the amendment was passed, the Tax Court had
just held that punitive damages are excluded from income; and while
that decision was reversed, the reversal took place after the amendment
had been adopted.' The original proposal for the 1989 amendment
of § 104(a) would have restricted the statutory exclusion of § 104(a)(2)
to damages obtained in cases where there was a physical injury. That
version was not then adopted by Congress. Instead, the Conference
Committee chose to preclude the application of the exclusion to puni-
tive damages in cases in which there was no physical injury. This
amendment apparently was made to provide assurance that, even if the
Tax Court's view, as announced in Miller, was sustained, at least the
punitive damages obtained for nonphysical injuries would be taxable.
The original version of the Conference Committee's bill would have
expressly allowed an exclusion for punitive damages when there was a
physical injury and have denied it to punitive damages only when there
was not a physical injury.' 9 That draft of the bill was corrected by
marking changes in ink on the bill itself. As altered, and as finally
adopted, the bill merely precludes an exclusion for punitive damages
obtained when there is no physical injury. The bill and the current
statute is silent as to the treatment of punitive damages when there is a
physical injury. The deliberate striking from the bill of the provision
allowing an exclusion for punitive damages when there is a physical
injury demonstrates beyond cavil that the silence on that topic in the
statute is deliberate, and that Congress had no wish to make any provi-
sion concerning that issue. 5
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in O'Gilvie."'5
O'Gilvie involves punitive damages received in a case where the victim
148. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989) (reviewed by the court) was decided before
the amendment was adopted, rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990) after the amendment had been
adopted.
149. H.R. Rep. No. 247, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25.
150. For a more thorough explanation of the evidence that the 1989 amendment does not
permit the exclusion of punitive damages obtained when there is a physical injury, and for a more
thorough discussion of the correct tax treatment of punitive damages, see Kahn, supra note 6, at
366-78.
151. O'Gilvie v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
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incurred a physical injury. The damages obtained in O'Gilvie were
received prior to the effective date of the 1989 Amendment to
§ 104(a)(2). Perhaps, the Court wishes to reconsider the position it
adopted in Schleier, or perhaps it merely wishes to examine the signifi-
cance of the 1989 Amendment.
G. Liquidated Damages
Liquidated damages can be provided to compensate an injured
party for intangible injuries, the amount and existence of which are
difficult to prove. If that is the function of a liquidated damage provi-
sion, and if the injury for which the damage is provided constitutes a
personal injury, and if the claim on which that damage is based is a
tort or tort-type claim, the liquidated damage should be excluded from
gross income by § 104(a)(2). That is a lot of "ifs" to be satisfied, but it
shows that it is possible for a liquidated damage to be excluded. How-
ever, if the provision primarily serves a punitive purpose, it will not be
excludible. If the provision requires a showing that the wrongdoer
knew that his action was unlawful or a showing that the wrongdoer's
action was especially egregious in some other respect, the Schleier
decision indicates that such a liquidated damage provision will be
characterized as punitive for purposes of § 104(a)(2).'52
If the characterization of a liquidated damage provision can be
determined by objective facts, such as whether the damage is allowed
only when the wrongdoer commits an especially bad act, the fact that
distinctions will be made between those provisions that are punitive
and those that are compensatory is not overly troublesome. But, if the
distinction is to be made by resort to language employed in the legisla-
tive history to determine the legislative purpose for enacting the provi-
sion, that is a much less satisfactory basis for arriving at different tax
consequences.
VII. CONCLUSION
As previously mentioned, the author views Schleier as making a
substantial improvement in the law as it appeared immediately after
Burke was decided. While the standards adopted by the Supreme Court
152. In Schleier, the Court stated: "[l1f liquidated damages were designed to compensate
ADEA victims, we see no reason why the employer's knowledge of the unlawfulness of his con-
duct should be the determinative factor in the award of liquidated damages." Schleier, 115 S. Ct.
at 2165. There will be no exclusion of post-1996 damages unless there was a physical injury.
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in Schleier are not optimum, they may be as good as a court could do
given the tortuous and unfortunate history of the manner in which the
doctrine for excluding certain damages had developed before the issue
reached the Schleier Court. The current state of the law on this issue
(especially after the 1996 amendment) appears manageable and roughly
conforms to tax policy considerations.
Schleier did not eliminate the availability of manipulation, but it
does reduce the scope of such actions. For example, it will no longer
be sufficient to obtain tax exclusion to cloak an employee's severance
pay in the guise of a tort settlement. However, to the extent that a pre-
1996 severance payment can successfully be disguised as a payment for
pain and suffering or for mental anguish of some type of tort (such as
intentional discrimination or an intentional infliction of emotional
harm), the payment may escape taxation. But, it will be difficult to es-
tablish that a payment truly is received in settlement of a legitimate
claim for such damages pursuant to a tort. In this regard, note that the
Tax Court has repudiated an allocation of damages made by parties and
approved by a court when the allocation was patently unreasonable and
when the payor had no reason to care how the payment was character-
ized. 53
Under Schleier, damages cannot be excluded unless they are re-
ceived as compensation for a personal injury." ' Economic losses that
accompany, but are not attributable to a personal injury, are no longer
excludible.55 The author believes that the justification for excluding
any damage from income rests on a view that it would be rapacious (or
at least unseemly) of the government to take from a victim part of the
compensation the victim received for the involuntary destruction of part
of his human capital. The restriction of the exclusion to damages that
are received in compensation of a personal loss (however the value of
that loss may be measured) comports with the policy justification for
the statutory provision to a much better extent than did the prior con-
struction of the statutory exclusion.
A better solution, was recently adopted. Section 1605 of the
SMALL BUSINESS JOB PROTECTION ACT of 1996 amended § 104 to re-
strict the exclusion of damages to those received on account of physical
153. Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994), affd on issue, rev'd on different issue,
70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3002 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (No. 95-
2067).
154. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
155. Id. at 2165.
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injury or physical sickness. 6 The statute expressly provides that
emotional distress is not deemed to be a physical injury or physical
sickness. 57 Punitive damages are made taxable except for certain
wrongful death damages awarded in a state where only punitive dam-
ages are permitted to be awarded for a wrongful death.'58 When puni-
tive damages are the exclusive remedy that is permitted for a wrongful
death, a substantial amount of such damages serves a compensatory
purpose. Presumably, Congress deemed the compensatory element in
many such cases to be sufficient to justify excluding the damages from
income.
This statutory provision should cure most of the remaining ills in
the treatment of damages, but some questions remain - for example,
whether a minor physical injury is truly the source of the claim.
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